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The  Non-­‐‑existence  of  Ontological  Categories:  A  defence  of  Lowe  
JTM  Miller  
Pre-­‐‑Proof  Version,  Forthcoming  in  Metaphysica  
0  –  Abstract  
This  paper  addresses  the  ontological  status  of  the  ontological  categories  as  defended  
within   E.J.   Lowe’s   four-­‐‑category   ontology   (kinds,   objects,   properties/relations,   and  
modes).   I   consider   the   arguments   in   Griffith   (2015)   against   Lowe’s   claim   that  
ontological   categories  do  not   exist,   and   argue   that  Griffith’s   objections   to  Lowe  do  
not   work   once   we   fully   take   advantage   of   ontological   resources   available   within  
Lowe’s  four-­‐‑category  ontology.  I  then  argue  that  the  claim  that  ontological  categories  
do  not  exist  has  no  undesirable  consequences  for  Lowe’s  brand  of  realism.  
1  –  Lowe’s  Argument  
E.J.  Lowe’s  argument  that  the  ontological  categories  do  not  exist  is  certainly  brief.  It  
is   included   amongst   a   more   general   defence   and   description   of   his   realist   four-­‐‑
category   ontology.   It   is   a   realist   proposal   in   that   the   differences   and   similarities  
between  entities  that  fall  into  each  category  are  in  no  way  dependent  upon  how  we  
describe  or  think  about  those  entities.    
Following  Griffith,  we  can  reconstruct  the  basic  argument  as  follows  (found  in  Lowe  
2006:  section  3.3):  
(1)  All  entities  can  be  categorized.  
(2)  Ontological  categories  cannot  be  categorized.  
(3)  Ontological  categories  are  not  entities.  (Griffith  2015:  26)  
The   conclusion   is   the   claim   that   the   ontological   categories   do   not   exist,   or,   put  
another  way,  are  not  elements  of  being.  The  argument  certainly  seems  to  be  valid;  (1)  
is  a  reasonable  premise  that  all  who  engage  in  realist  categorical  ontology  are  likely  
to  accept;  (2)  has  to  be  the  premise  that  we  reject  if  we  are  to  reject  the  conclusion.    
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I  will  not  rehearse  Lowe’s  arguments   in  favour  of   (2)   in   this  section  as   they  will  be  
discussed  in  turn  in  the  subsequent  sections.  It   is  worth  noting  though  that  they  all  
share   a   similar   theme.  That   is   that   the   ontological   categories   cannot   themselves   be  
categorised  because  in  some  way  the  categories  themselves  do  not  have  the  features  
required   to   be   instances   of   the   categories.   If   this   claim   is   correct,   then,   as   the   four  
categories   are   exhaustive,   Lowe   would   certainly   be   right   in   concluding   that   the  
ontological   categories   are   “not   to   be   included   in   a   exhaustive   inventory   of   what  
exists”  (2006:  43).1  
2  –  Some  Preliminaries  
In   the   previous   section   I   outlined   the   basic   structure   of   Lowe’s   argument   that  
ontological  categories  are  not  further  elements  of  being.  Following  Griffith,  premise  
(2)  is  of  most  interest  to  us.  It  is  (2)  that  Griffith  denies.  
We   should   note   straight   away   the   ambiguity   in   how   (2)   is   phrased.   (2)   holds   that  
‘Ontological   categories   cannot   be   categorised’.   There   are   two  ways   of   reading   (2),  
and  what  Lowe’s  aims  might  be  when  stating  something   that  amounts   to   it.  Either  
we  can  read  Lowe  as  saying  that  there  is  no  way  at  all  –  that  it  is  not  possible  within  
any  ontology  –   to  categorise  ontological   categories;  or  we  can  read  Lowe  as  saying  
that,  within  his  own  particular  ontological   system,  ontological   categories  cannot  be  
categorised.  The  difference  between  these  two  readings  is  clear.  I  think  that  there  are  
good  reasons  to  think  that  Lowe  intends  the  second,  in  a  sense  weaker,  reading.  This  
would  mean  that  his  argument  is  trying  to  show  that  within  his  ontological  system  the  
ontological   categories   cannot   be   categorised,   and   subsequently   are   not   elements   of  
being.    
First,   Lowe   makes   his   argument   within   his   book   The   Four-­‐‑Category   Ontology.   The  
book   is   very   plausibly   intended   primarily   (if   not   overwhelmingly)   to   be   an  
introduction   to   and  defence  of  Lowe’s   own  ontology,  with   arguments   in   favour  of  
each  of  its  components  and  an  illustration  of  the  explanatory  power  that  the  ontology  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1     I  focus  here  solely  on  Lowe’s  solution  to  the  problem  of  the  existence  or  non-­‐‑existence  of  ontological  
categories.  This  is  not  to  presuppose  that  Lowe’s  solution  is  the  only  nor  that  it  is  the  best  solution  to  
this  problem.    
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possesses  with  respect  to  a  wide  range  of  broader  metaphysical  issues.  Perhaps  Lowe  
does  not  make  this  clear  in  the  passages  in  which  he  is  putting  forward  his  argument  
that   ontological   categories   cannot   be   categorised,   but   I   think   that  we   can   conclude  
that  this  is  his  intention  from  at  least  one  other  passages  in  the  book.  At  a  later  time,  
when  discussing  how  the  ontological  square  might  alter  commonly  accepted  logical  
syntax,  Lowe  states:  
I  do  not  expect  this  ontological  scheme  to  seem  entirely  compelling  
simply   on   the   basis   of   the   very   sketchy   account   of   it   that   I   have  
provided   here,   but   it   is   not   vital   for   my   present   purpose   that   I  
should  be  able  to  convince  the  reader  of  its  correctness.  My  current  
purpose   is  merely   to   persuade   the   reader   that   it   is   legitimate   and  
indeed   desirable   to   tailor   one’s   theory   of   logical   syntax   to   one’s  
ontological  convictions.  For  this  purpose,  I  need  nothing  more  than  
the   reader’s   concurrence   that   the   four-­‐‑category   ontology   as   I   have  
sketched   it   is   at   least   coherent   and  worthy  of   consideration.   (2006:  
76)  
I   think   the   same   goes   generally   for   this   book.   Elsewhere,   Lowe   has   produced   his  
arguments   against   other   ontologies;   in  The   Four-­‐‑Category  he   intends   to   propose   an  
ontology,   illustrating   its   consequences,   limits,   and   explanatory   power.   This  would  
only  support  the  weaker  reading  of  premise  (2).    
Further  to  this,  Lowe’s  claim  is  largely  supported  by  appealing  to  the  definitions  that  
he   has   himself   given   for   the   ontological   categories.   Appealing   to   such   definitions  
would   clearly   be   circular   if   the   intention   was   to   defend   the   stronger   thesis   that  
ontological  categories  can  in  principle  not  be  categorised.  But  this  appeal  is  perfectly  
justified   if   I   am  correct   that  Lowe’s   intention   is   to   say   that,  within  his  own  ontology,  
ontological  categories  cannot  be  categorised.  Of  course,  this  claim  then  rests  upon  the  
plausibility  of  the  ontology  more  broadly,  but  that  is  an  issue  that  we  can  put  to  one  
side  here,  and  it  not  the  source  of  the  arguments  that  Griffith  makes  against  Lowe.  If  
Lowe’s  ontology  is  to  be  criticised  for  that  feature,  then  its  failure  there  needs  to  be  
weighed  against  its  other  claimed  strengths.  It  certainly  does  not  seem  to  be  the  case  
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that  the  failure  to  say  that  the  ontological  categories  can  themselves  be  categorised  is  
enough  to  reject  an  entire  ontology  outright.    
This  distinction   in  how   to   read  premise   (2)  may  not   seem   important   initially,  but   I  
will   argue   that   a   number   of   the   claims   that   Griffith   makes   against   Lowe   fail   to  
recognise   that   the   arguments   must   always   be   seen   within   the   context   of   Lowe’s  
ontology.   Griffith’s   claims   often   rest   on   rejecting   assumptions   that   Lowe   makes  
about  his  four-­‐‑category  ontology,  and  whilst  Lowe’s  claims  and  his  entire  ontology  
might   be   flawed,   it   is   not   relevant   to   whether   Lowe’s   ontology   can   categorise  
ontological  categories.  Given  how  important  this  will  be  later  in  the  paper,  I  will  now  
outline   some   key   parts   of   Lowe’s   four-­‐‑category   ontology,   beginning   with   Lowe’s  
‘ontological  square’  (2006:  18):  








Lowe   in   his   ontology   makes   an   exhaustive   and   exclusive   distinction   between  
universals   and   particulars.   Importantly,   “the   terms   ‘particular’   and   ‘universal’  
themselves,  we  may  say,  do  not  strictly  denote  categories,  however,  because  they  are  
transcategorial,   applying   as   they   do   to   entities   belonging   to   different   basic  
categories”   (2006:  21).  This   is   crucial   in   that  Lowe’s  ontology,  as  he   readily  admits,  
does  not  contain  just  four-­‐‑categories,  but  rather  four  fundamental  categories.  This  can  
be  seen  in  this  reproduced  diagram  from  Lowe  (2006:  39):  
Characterised  
by	  Kinds     Attributes  (Properties/  
Relations)	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Although   the  might   initially  appear   to  be,   the  categories  of   ‘particular’,   ‘universal’,  
and  ‘entity’  “are  not  more  fundamental  than  those  of  the  third  level  because  they  are  
mere  abstractions  and  do  no  serious  ontological  work  on  their  own  account”  (Lowe  
2006:  39).  (The  ‘third  level’  here  refers  to  the  fundamental  categories  of  kinds,  objects,  
properties/relations,   and   modes.)   The   lack   of   serious   ontological   work   being  
shouldered  by  the  universal/particular  distinction  is  because  whilst  it  is  an  important  
distinction,   “it   serves   to   explain   nothing   in   ontology   that   is   not   fully   explicable   in  
terms  of  the  defining  features  of  the  four  categories  at  the  third  level”  (2006:  39).  In  
other   words,   and   this   will   be   important   later,   the   distinction   is   explained   by   the  
features  of  the  four  fundamental  categories  rather  than  explaining  the  features  of  the  
categories.  The  explanatory  priority  is  clear  in  Lowe’s  work,  and  within  his  ontology  it  
justifies  why  the  categories  of  universal  and  particular  do  no  ontological  work  (I  will  
return   later   to   why   the   category   of   ‘entity’   also   does   no   ontological   work   within  
Lowe’s  ontology).  
Given   this   exhaustive   and   exclusive   distinction   between   entities,   if   ontological  
categories   are   to   be   categorised  within   Lowe’s   ontology,   they  must   either   fall   into  
one  of   the   two  categories   that  are  universal   (kinds  and  properties/relations),  or   the  
two   that   are  particular   (objects/modes).   If   they   cannot   be   so   categorised,   then   they  
cannot   be   elements   of   being.   Griffith   accepts   with   Lowe   that   the   ontological  
categories  cannot  be  particular,   leaving  only   two  possible  ontological  categories   for  
the   categories   themselves   to   be   instances   of.   I  will   split  my  discussion  of  Griffith’s  




Kinds	   Properties  
and  Relations	   Objects	   Modes	  
Substances	   Non-­‐‑substances	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categories   could   be   categorised   as   universal   properties,   and   the   second   that   the  
categories  could  be  categorised  as  kinds.  
3  -­‐‑  Categories  Categorised  as  Universals  
The  first  argument  that  Griffith  rejects  is  Lowe’s  claim  that  the  categories  cannot  be  
universal  properties  because  “a  universal  is  that  which  has  (or,  in  a  weaker  version,  
that  which  can  have)  instances”  (2006:  39).  Lowe  here  means  universal  in  the  sense  of  
either  universal  properties  or  kinds,  as  both  have,  or  can  have,   instances.  However,  
Griffith   focuses   on   the   question   of   whether   the   ontological   categories   could   be  
categorised   as   universal   properties.   He   does   not   comment   on   this   argument   from  
Lowe   with   respect   to   whether   it   rules   out   the   ontological   categories   being  
categorised   as   kinds   despite   that   category   also   being   universal.   Griffith   instead  
produces   an   alternative   argument   about   categories   as   kinds,   which   I   discuss   in  
section  4.  In  the  rest  of  this  section,  I  follow  Griffith  in  using  ‘universals’  to  refer  to  
what  Lowe  would  more  specifically  call  universal  properties.  
The  argument  is  about  higher-­‐‑level  universals.  Lowe  has  claimed  that  a  universal  is  
that  which  has  or  can  have  instances.  Griffith  correctly  points  out  that  “we  may  hold  
instead  that  the  defining  feature  of  universals  is  simply  that  they  have  (or  can  have)  
instances,   whether   particular   or   universal”   (2015:   30).   Indeed   this   is   available   to  
Lowe   because   he   accepts   that   the   instances   of   a   universal   could   themselves   be  
universals   (2006:   89).   Lowe   therefore   needs   a   reason   for   rejecting   that   ontological  
categories  are  not  higher-­‐‑order  universals.    
The   reason   given   is   that   the   higher-­‐‑order   universals   that   the   different   categories  
would   belong   to   would   be   different,   and   thus   no   real   universal   links   them.   For  
example:  the  category  of  kinds  would  be  a  second-­‐‑order  universal  as  its  instances  are  
other  kinds  that  are  themselves  universals;  whilst  the  category  of  objects  would  be  a  
first-­‐‑order   universal   as   its   instances   are   particular   substances.   Griffith   objects   that  
“even  if  these  categories  belong  to  different  categories  in  this  sense,  they  are  still  both  
universals”   (2015:   30).   The   claim   is   that   there   could   be   some   additional   level   to  
	   7	  
Lowe’s  ontology  which  all   the  ontological  categories  are   instances  of,  and   thus   this  
additional  level  is  a  universal  (as  it  has,  or  can  have,  instances).  
Griffith  is  correct  in  a  sense  to  say  that  this  is  a  possibility.  It  might  be  the  case  that  
some   ontologies   can   allow   for   multi-­‐‑level   universals   where   the   instances   are  
themselves  universals  of  differing  orders  (first,  second,  third  etc.).  The  issue  will  be  
whether   within   Lowe’s   ontology,   can   we   have   universals   whose   instances   are   of  
different   orders.   Griffith   does   also   point   out   that   Lowe   has   an   argument   that   this  
cannot  be  the  case:  
But   what   now   about   the   category   of   universals   itself?   If   that   is   a  
universal,  of  what  order  is  it?  It  is  hard  to  see  how  it  could  be  of  any  
order,  because  a  universal  of  any  order  whatever  must  belong  to  the  
category   of   universals   –   and   so   if   the   category   of   universals   is   a  
universal   of   some   order,   it   seems   that   it   must,   absurdly,   be   of   a  
higher  order  than  itself.  (2006:  42)  
After  all,  if  we  want  to  say  that  the  ontological  categories  can  be  categorised,  then  we  
should  certainly   say   that   they  should  all  belong   to   the   same  category.  Therefore,   if  
the  particular   category  of  universals   cannot   itself   be   shown   to  be   a  universal,   then  
none   of   the   ontological   categories   of   Lowe’s   ontology   are   universals.   Griffith   also  
accepts   that   if  Lowe   is   right   that  universals  must  be  of   a  particular  order   then   this  
absurdity   follows   (2015:   31).   So   the   question   now   has   to   be   what   reasons   are   we  
given   for   rejecting   Lowe’s   argument   against   the   category   of   universals   being   a  
universal.  Griffith  offers  two  claims  for  this.    
First,   that   we   have   no   reason   for   accepting   the   assumption   Lowe   is   offering,  
providing   the   examples  of   the  property  of   ‘being   a  higher  order  property’   and   the  
property  of   ‘being  a  property’   as   cases   that   exist  but  might  have   instances   that   are  
higher-­‐‑order  than  themselves  (2015:  31).  Second,  that  this  assumption  “entails  that  no  
universal   is   self-­‐‑instantiating”   (2015:   31).  Griffith   simply   states   this   as   false,   stating  
that   the   property   of   ‘being   a   property’   is   itself   a   property   as   evidence   for   this  
falseness.    
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However,  each  of   these  reasons   fail.  The   first   fails  as  we  have  reason,  within  Lowe’s  
ontology,   for   rejecting   these  kinds  of  properties.  Lowe’s   argument,   as  Griffith  notes  
(2015:   31fn),   is   that  we   have   no   reason   posit   the   higher   order   property   of   being   a  
colour  property  as  a  constituent  of  the  truthmaker  for  the  statement  ‘the  property  of  
being   red   is   a   colour   property.’   Instead,   “one   possibility   is   that  what  makes   it   the  
case   that   a   certain  property   is   a   colour-­‐‑property   is   the   fact   that   objects   bearing   the  
property   are,   in   virtue   of   bearing   it,   coloured   in   one   way   or   another”   (2006:   71).  
Griffith  claims  that  this  fact  does  not  explain  properly  why  the  property  is  a  colour  
property:    
“if  object  O  is  colored  because  O  bears  F,  it  is  presumably  because  of  
the   nature   of   F   as   a   color   property   that   O   is   colored.   But   if   O   is  
colored  because  F  is  a  color  property,  then  F  is  not  a  color  property  
because  O  is  colored  (in  virtue  of  having  F),  given  the  asymmetry  of  
explanation.   On   the   other   hand,   if   F   instantiated   the   property   of  
being  a  color  property   that  would  explain   the   truth  of   ‘F   is  a  color  
property.’”  (2015:  31fn).  
However,  I  think  there  is  good  reason  to  think  Lowe  would  reject  this  analysis  given  
the  ontological   tools  available  within  his  ontology.  Let  us  clarify   the  picture  within  
Lowe’s  ontology:  Object  O  is  coloured  because  it  bears  F.  F  will  be  a  particular  mode;  
F  will  be  an  instantiation  of  a  universal  property,  U;  O  will  exemplify  U;  and  O  is  an  
instantiation  of  some  universal  kind,  K,  where  K  is  characterised  by  U.  We  thus  have  
filled  out  Lowe’s  ontological  square.  Of  course,  above  this  all  is  the  non-­‐‑ontologically  
load  bearing  category  of  an  entity.  Griffith  seems  to  use  ‘object’  to  refer  to  what  Lowe  
would  say  is  the  entity,  with  the  object  being  the  particular  substance.  This  problem  
will  be  relevant  again  in  the  next  section.  
Within  this  system  it  seems  correct  to  say  that  we  have  no  need  for  the  higher  order  
property   of   ‘being   a   colour   property’.   F   is   a   colour   property   just   because   it   is   an  
instantiation   of   some   universal   U.      Hence   the   higher-­‐‑order   property   of   ‘being   a  
colour’  is  not  part  of  the  truthmaker  for  the  claim.  The  truthmaker  instead  consists  in  
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the  particular  property   (mode),   and   the  universal  property.  The   truthmaker   is   that  
the  mode  F  is  an  instantiation  of  U.  
Of   course  we  might   ask  what  U   itself   is   –   it   is   the   universal   ‘redness’,   or   is   it   the  
universal   ‘coloured’.   But   Lowe   is   clear   that   he   thinks   that   such   questions   are   not  
directly   within   the   realm   of   metaphysics.   Which   things   exist   and   which   category  
they   fall   into   is   (at   least   partly)   a   matter   for   empirical   science.   As   Lowe   states:  
“metaphysics   should   not   be   in   the   business   of   dictating   to   empirical   scientists  
precisely   how   they   should   categorize   the   theoretical   entities   whose   existence   they  
postulate.  Metaphysics   supplies   the   categories,   but   how   best   to   apply   them   in   the  
construction   of   specific   scientific   theories   is   a   matter   best   left   to   the   theorists  
themselves,   provided   that   they   respect   the   constraints   which   the   categorial  
framework   imposes”   (2006:   19).   It   seems   therefore   that  within   Lowe’s   ontology   at  
least,  we  have  no  good   reason   for   thinking   that   such   troublesome  universals   exist,  
and  Lowe’s  claim  against  them  stands.  
Griffith’s   second   point   was   that   the   view   “entails   that   no   universal   is   self-­‐‑
instantiating”   (2015:   31),   offering   that   the   property   of   ‘being   a   property’   is   itself   a  
property  as  an  example.  However,  we  have  already  seen   that  we  have  no  need   for  
such   higher-­‐‑order   properties.   Instead,   some   mode   instantiates   some   universal  
property.  Griffith’s  claim  that  the  property  of  ‘being  a  property’  is  itself  a  property,  
read   within   Lowe’s   ontology   (as   it   should   in   a   paper   about   Lowe’s   view   on   the  
ontological  status  of  the  ontological  categories),  makes  use  of  two  different  meanings  
of   the   term   ‘property’   which   is   a   specific   category   for   Lowe   (this   is   perhaps  why  
Lowe  often  referred  to  universal  properties  as  ‘attributes’).   If   ‘being  a  property’  did  
exist,   and   is   a   property,   then   it   would   need   to   be   given   the   appropriate  
mode/universal  analysis.    
Furthermore,  even  if  the  above  does  fail,  it  is  hardly  without  support  that  no  set  can  
be  a  member  of  itself.  As  a  set,  the  property  of  ‘being  a  property’  would  have  to  be  
just  such  a  member.  Either  way,  Lowe’s  claim  that  universals  in  his  ontology  cannot  
have  instances  that  are  of  different  orders  is  reasonable  and  defendable.    
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Griffith’s   last   claim   that   the   categories   could   be   categorised   as   universals   is   the  
easiest   to   counter,   but   is   revealing   towards   the   problem   I’ve   tried   to   highlight   as  
perhaps   underlying   the   two   previous   claims.   Lowe   argues   that   the   ontological  
categories   cannot   be   categorised   as   universals   because   the   category   of   objects  
(particular   substances)   cannot   itself   be   a   universal   because   it   cannot   be   either   a  
property  or  a  kind.  This   is  because  in  Lowe’s  ontology,  properties  have  modes,  not  
objects,  as  instances.  Thus,  the  “problem  is  supposed  to  be  that  the  property  of  ‘being  
an   object’   would   have   objects   rather   than   modes   as   instances”   (Griffith   2015:   31).  
Griffith’s  counter  is  that  there  is  “a  simple  response  to  this  would  be  to  reject  Lowe’s  
particular  way  of  organizing  the  four  categories,  i.e.,  to  deny  that  properties  have  (or  
exclusively  have)  modes  as  instances”  (2015:  31).  
However,  this  is  clearly  unsatisfactory  with  regards  to  a  question  of  the  status  of  the  
ontological   categories   within   Lowe’s   ontology.   It   might   be   that   some   alternative  
ontology  could  be  developed  and  defended  in  line  with  this.  In  such  an  ontology,  the  
ontological  categories  might  be  able  to  be  categorised  and  so  shown  to  be  elements  of  
being.  But  as  I  stressed  earlier,  that  is  not  within  the  remit  of  what  Lowe  is  trying  to  
show.  The  natural  way,  in  line  with  the  rest  of  The  Four-­‐‑Category,  is  to  read  premise  
(2)   in  a  weaker  sense  such   that  Lowe’s  aim   is   to  show  that  within  his  ontology   the  
ontological   categories   cannot   be   categorised.   It   is   a   separate  matter   as   to   whether  
such  categorisation   is  possible   in  other  ontologies,   and  Lowe’s   failure   to   show   that  
cannot  be  taken  to  be  an  argument  against  his  claims  about  what  is  possible  within  
his  ontology.    
This   is   revealing,   though,   as   to   the   possible   source   of   the  weaknesses   in   the   other  
claims  against  Lowe.  The  claims  seem  to  fail  to  locate  Lowe’s  arguments  about  what  
can   and   cannot   be   within   an   ontological   category   within   the   broader   claims   and  
structure  of  that  ontology.  This  is  especially  the  case  in  that  Lowe’s  claim  (correct  or  
not)   is   that   the   features   of   the   four   fundamental   categories   explain   the   distinction  
between   universals   and   particulars   rather   than   that   distinction   explaining   the  
features   of   the   categories.  Given   this,   it   is   hardly   surprising   that  we   cannot   create  
some  category  of  universals  that  explain,  amongst  others,  the  category  of  universals.  
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This  would   be   entirely   circular   if   it  was   the   case.   Instead,   the   abstract   category   of  
universals   that   does   no   ontological   work   is   explained   by   the   nature   of   the   two  
categories,   properties/relations   and   kinds,   which   it   contains.   Again,   we   might  
provide   reasons   against   Lowe’s   conception   and   against   his   broader   ontology,   but  
this  would  support  his  claim  that  within  his  ontology  at  least,  ontological  categories  
cannot  be  universals.  
4  -­‐‑  Categories  Categorised  as  Kinds  
We   have   already   noted   that   Lowe   takes   the   universal/particular   distinction   to   be  
both   exhaustive   and   exclusive,   and   that   the   ontological   categories   cannot   be  
categorised   as   particulars.   Having   defended   why,   in   Lowe’s   ontology,   the  
ontological   categories   cannot   be   categorised   as   properties/relations,   it   remains   to  
discuss  whether  the  categories  might  be  kinds.    
Lowe’s  argument  against   this   turns  on   the   failure  of   the  category  of  objects   to  be  a  
kind.  As  also  already  noted,  if  one  of  the  ontological  categories  cannot  be  categorised  
in  a  certain  way,  then  none  of  the  categories  can  be  categorised.  So  if  the  ontological  
categories  are  to  be  categorised  then  they  need  to  be  instances  of  the  same  category.  
However,  the  category  of  objects  cannot  be  a  kind  because  kinds  bestow  a  single  set  
of   identity   conditions   on   the   objects   that   belong   to   them.   A   posited   highest   kind  
‘object’   could  not  bestow   identity   conditions   for  all   of   its   instances  given   that   such  
entities  have  very  different  identity  conditions  (2006:  43).  Given  this,  the  category  of  
object  cannot  be  a  kind  as   there   is  no  single  set  of   identity  conditions   that   the  kind  
‘object’  would  bestow  upon  the  objects  that  belong  to  the  kind.  
Griffith’s   response   is   to   undercut   the   argument   by   trying   to   show   that   this   limits  
Lowe’s  ability  to  say  that  terms  such  as  ‘organism’  express  kinds.  The  reason  for  this  
is   that   terms  such  as   ‘organism’,   ‘substance’,  and   ‘animal’  do  not  supply  one  set  of  
identity   conditions   upon   the   objects   that   they   apply   to.   Many   things   satisfy  
‘organism’,   and  objects,  Griffith   claims,   instantiate   the   kind   ‘organism’   in   virtue   of  
instantiating  other  kinds  such  as  ‘dog’,  or  ‘cat’.  This  means  that  the  kind  ‘organism’  
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supplies  more  than  one  set  of  identity  conditions  upon  the  objects  to  which  it  applies.  
Therefore  we  might  ask  why  this  cannot  be  the  case  for  ‘object’.    
However,  I  think  that  this  rests  on  a  confusion.  If  Griffith  means  ‘object’  in  the  sortal  
sense   in   which   I   can   say   that   the   room   I   am   in   contains   many   objects,   then   this  
follows.  But   for   the  argument  to  work  against  Lowe,   it  must  be  shown  that  Lowe’s  
specific   notion   ‘object’   could   be   a   kind.   ‘Object’   for   Lowe   means   a   particular  
substance.  So  let  us  try  to  reformulate  the  claim.  It   is  that  the  category  of  particular  
substance   cannot   itself   be   a   kind;   and   this   is   because   no   single   set   of   identity  
conditions   could  be  given   for   the  kind.  Note  here,   it   is   again  not  valid   to  object   to  
Lowe’s  claim  that  this  is  what  a  kind  is.  This  claim  might  independently  be  incorrect,  
but   the   question   again   is   whether   ontological   categories   within   Lowe’s   ontology  
could  be  categorised  in  line  with  the  weaker  reading  of  premise  (2).  
Let  us  consider  the  claim  that  no  single  set  of  identity  conditions  could  be  given  for  
the  kind  ‘particular  substance’.  We  therefore  want  an  identity  condition  for  the  kind  
‘particular  substance’  of  the  form:  
Particular  substance:   If  x  and  y  are  particular   substances,   then  x   is  
the  same  particular  substance  as  y   iff   there   is  
some  K  such  that  x  is  the  same  K  as  y  
I  will  go  through  what  seem  to  me  to  be  the  main  options  for  fleshing  this  out,  all  of  
which  are  unsatisfactory.  
Perhaps,   first,   we   might   think   that   all   objects   that   fall   under   the   kind   ‘particular  
substance’  are  substances.  This  would  seem  to  be  the  most  obvious  route.  However,  
we  must   remember   that   within   Lowe’s   ontology   the   category   of   ‘objects’   actually  
allows   for  both   substances   and  non-­‐‑substances.   If   is   a   further  matter  whether  both  
have  instances;  but  the  ontology  should  not  rule  either  out  a  priori.  That  Lowe  thinks  
this  can  be  seen  from  the  hierarchy  that  he  draws  replicated  again  below  (2006:  39):  
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From   this   we   can   clearly   see   that   the   notion   of   substance   could   not   provide   an  
identity  condition  for  the  kind  ‘particular  substance’.  Not  all  entities  that  fall  under  
the  kind  are  substances  as  some  are  non-­‐‑substances.  Even  if  no  entities  should  turn  
out  to  be  non-­‐‑substances,  we  should  not  rule  out  such  entities  a  priori.    
The  notion  of  ‘object’  that  Griffith  suggests  is  another  possibility.  However,  this  too  
will  not  suffice  to  give  us  a  set  of  distinct  identity  conditions  for  the  kind  ‘particular  
substance’.   Firstly,   the   term   cannot   be   being   used   in   the   way   that   Lowe   uses   the  
term,  else  clear  circularity  would  occur.  What  Griffith  must  have  in  mind  is  instead  
some  sort  of  general  sortal  notion  of  ‘object’.  This  would  be  closer  to  the  term  ‘thing’.  
However,  as  has  been  argued  by  Thomasson  recently,  the  general  sortal  term  ‘object’  
possesses  no  clear  semantic  content  when  used  in  this  way.  This  means  that  “we  can  
only   answer   the   question   ‘is   there   some   object?’   by  way   of   answering   the   various  
sortal-­‐‑specific   existence   questions”   (2015:   109).   Thomasson’s   point   here,   although  
used  for  different  purposes,  is  that  no  application  conditions  –  the  semantic  analogue  
of  metaphysical  identity  conditions  –  can  be  given  for  the  general  sortal  ‘object’.  I  see  
no  reason  why  Lowe  would  not  also  embrace  this  conclusion  with  respect  to  this  use  
of   ‘object’   (rather   than   the   more   precise   use   of   the   term   to   refer   to   a   particular  
substance   within   the   four-­‐‑category   ontology).   Trying   to   use   such   a   general  
semantically   empty   sortal   here   would   not   give   us   any   identity   conditions   for   the  




Kinds	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The  last  general  notion  that  we  might  try  would  be  that  of  entity.  This  might  also  be  
the  general  notion  that  Griffith  is  hinting  towards  with  the  discussion  of  ‘object’  as  a  
kind.   Thus   all   things   that   fall   under   the   kind   ‘particular   substance’   are   entities.  
However,  whilst   this   is   true,   this   is   clearly   unsatisfactory  within   Lowe’s   ontology.  
First,   there   is  already  an  abstract  category  of  entity,  although  it  does  no  ontological  
work.   As   Lowe   states,   “everything   whatever   that   does   or   could   exist   may   be  
categorized  as  an  ‘entity’”  (2006:  7).  This  is  clearly  not  a  suitable  way  to  understand  
the   kind   ‘particular   substance’   as   this   would   include   all   instances   of   the   other  
categories  as   instances  of   the  category   ‘objects’   (or   if  we  maintain   the  translation  of  
Lowe’s  specific  terminology,  the  category  of  ‘particular  substance’).    
Second,  and  connected  to  this,  the  notion  of  ‘entity’  cuts  across  both  universals  and  
particulars   for   Lowe.   Given   that   we   have   accepted   with   Lowe   that   a   kind   must  
bestow  a  single  set  of  identity  conditions  on  the  objects  that  fall  under  that  kind,  it  is  
hard  to  see  how  any  such  single  set  of  identity  conditions  could  be  found.  It  is  very  
hard  to  see  what  sort  of   identity  conditions  would  allow  for  such  disparate  natures  
within  a  single  kind.  Indeed,  given  that  we  accepted  that  universals  and  particular  is  
an  exhaustive  and  exclusive  distinction,  I  cannot  see  how  any  single  set  could  even  in  
principle  be  given.  
Third,  much  like  the  abstract  categories  of  ‘universal’  and  ‘particular’,  within  Lowe’s  
ontology   the   notion   of   ‘entity’   only   gets   any   content   from   the   nature   of   the   four  
fundamental  categories.  Remember  for  Lowe,  these  abstract  categories  are  explained  
by   the   four   fundamental   categories   not   the   other   way   round.   Any   attempt   to  
introduce  a  general  catch-­‐‑all  sortal  term  ‘object’  in  the  way  that  Griffith  does  would  
be  equivalent  to  Lowe’s  notion  of  ‘entity’,  and  thus  to  use  it  to  explain  the  ontological  
categories   is   to   fail   to   see   the   explanatory   asymmetry   within   the   ontology   under  
consideration.  
(Note  that  we  cannot  even  use  a  notion  like  ‘instantiated’.  This  is  ruled  out  because  
Lowe’s   ontology   should   again   not   a   priori   decide   the   status   of   non-­‐‑instantiated  
entities.  Perhaps   there  are   some,  perhaps  not.  Given   the  purpose  of  an  ontology  of  
this  sort  is  to  categories  all  things  that  are  more  neutrally  elements  of  being,  our  basic  
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ontological  picture  should  not  dictate  whether  non-­‐‑instantiated  entities  are  elements  
of  being  or  not.)  
5  –  Maintaining  Realism  
In   this   last,  briefer  section,   I  wish   to  comment  on  whether  Lowe’s  position   that   the  
ontological  categories  are  not  themselves  elements  of  being  puts  his  brand  of  realism  
in   danger.   The   threat   is   that   if   we   are   nominalists   about   ontological   category  
predicates,   then  what   is   to   stop  us   being  nominalists   about   other   predicates?  Why  
does   nominalism   in   one   area   not   lead   to   a   more   widespread   nominalism.   Lowe’s  
argument  here  is  simple:  
As  a  first  defensive  move,  we  can,  of  course,  point  out  that  not  every  
meaningful   predicate,   whether   monadic   or   relational,   need   or  
indeed  can  be  supposed  to  denote  an  existing  property  or  relation  –  
so   that   it   is   not   obligatory   to   suppose   that  predicates   such   as   ‘is   a  
universal’   or   ‘instantiates’   denote,   respectively   a   monadic   and   a  
relational  universal.  (2006:  46)  
The  claim  just  is  the  well-­‐‑supported  thought  that  just  because  we  have  the  predicate,  
does   not  mean   that  we   have   to   accept   the   universal.   There   are   relatively   few   that  
deny  this  claim.  Griffith,   though,  says   that  “the  challenge   is   to  supply  some  reason  
for   thinking   that  nominalism  about  ontological  categorical  predicates  does  not   lead  
to  nominalism  about  other  predicates”  (2015:  29).    
This  challenge  seems  to  have  already  been  met  by  Lowe.  Our  ontology   is  meant   to  
apply   to   all   entities.   This   means   that   anything   that   cannot   be   situated  within   our  
ontology  –   is  not  an   instance  of   any  of   the   four   fundamental   categories  –   is  not  an  
element   of   being.   The   preceding   section   has   argued   that   the   ontological   categories  
are  not  elements  of  being  for  this  very  reason.  This  is  why  we  have  good  reason  to  be  
nominalists  about  them.  As  for  other  predicates  such  as  ‘is  red’  and  ‘is  spherical’,  this  
would   seem   to   be   a   further   matter.   Pending   some   additional   argument,   the  
universals   that   these   predicates   would   refer   to   can   be   situated   within   Lowe’s  
ontology.  This  means  that  they  at  the  very  least  could  exist.  It  does  not  mean  that  they  
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do  exist,  as   this  would  be  an  empirical  matter  within  Lowe’s  broader  metaphysical  
account.    
Of  course  it  may  turn  out  that  the  predicates  ‘is  red’  and  ‘is  spherical’  do  refer,  but  do  
not   refer   to   universals,   which   Griffith   assumes.   This   is   in   line  with   Lowe’s   stated  
view:  “metaphysics  should  not  be  in  the  business  of  dictating  to  empirical  scientists  
precisely   how   they   should   categorize   the   theoretical   entities   whose   existence   they  
postulate.  Metaphysics   supplies   the   categories,   but   how   best   to   apply   them   in   the  
construction   of   specific   scientific   theories   is   a   matter   best   left   to   the   theorists  
themselves,   provided   that   they   respect   the   constraints   which   the   categorial  
framework  imposes”  (2006:  19).    
Putting  it  another  way,  the  threat  of  nominalism  about  some  predicates  leading  us  to  
nominalism  about  some  other  predicates  simply  does  not  exist.  Each  predicate  needs  
to  be  taken  on  a  case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case  basis.  If  what  the  predicates  are  taken  to  refer  to  cannot  
be   categorised   at   all,   then   we   have   good   reason   to   be   nominalists   about   that  
predicates.  Otherwise,  it  is  partly  an  empirical  matter  as  to  where  to  categorise  those  
referring   entities.   There   simply   seems   to   be   no   slippery   slope   from   a   local  
nominalism   to   a   global   form.   There   seems   to   be   nothing   inherently   troublesome  
about   maintaining   Lowe’s   realist   ontology   that   is   aimed   at   determining   what  
ontological  categories  are,  what  categories  we  should  acknowledge,  how  categories  
are   organized,   and  how   categories   are   to   be   identified   and  distinguished   (2006:   6),  
whilst   being   nominalists   about   ontological   category   predicates.   We   can   therefore  
fully   accept   the  weaker   version   of   premise   (2),   and   state   that   Lowe   is   correct   that,  
within  his  ontology,  ontological  categories  are  not  elements  of  being.  
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